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the one hundredth anniversary of the Ukrainian Revolution: the 

















changes	 in	 the	way	history	 is	 thought	 about	by	 the	Ukrain-
ian	public,	 especially	 in	 opinion-forming	 circles.	The	 liberal	
reflection	 critical	 about	 the	 nationalist	 tradition	 initiated	



















sian	 Federation	 increasingly	 refers	 to	 Soviet	 times	makes	 it	
easier	for	Ukrainians	to	also	reject	the	Soviet	tradition,	which	
is	combined	with	their	acceptance	of	decommunisation.	


































dition	 of	 national	 history.	 However,	 any	 critical	 reflection	
concerning	 this	organisation	has	been	hampered,	given	 the	
wartime	propa	ganda	needs	of	and	due	to	the	fact	 that	criti-




World	War	 II	 hushes	 up	 or	 downplays	 in	 various	ways	 the	
crimes	they	committed.	




self	 is	downplayed,	 thus	becoming	an	 increasing	problem	in	
Ukraine’s	relations	with	the	West.	
















is	preserved,	 the	decommunisation	of	 the	national	 tradition	









Ukrainian	struggle	 for	 independence	 focused	on	 the	history	
of	 the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	 (a	social	democratic	state	
set	up	in	1917)	was	launched	in	March	2017.	These	celebrations	






































the	memory	of	 those	killed	during	 the	Maidan	 (Heavenly	Hun-
dred)	and	during	 the	war	 (Heavenly	Guard)	manifested,	 for	ex-
ample,	through	the	erection	of	numerous	monuments.	Nor	does	it	
raise	the	issue	of	the	still	existing,	albeit	less	intense	than	under	
Viktor	 Yanukovych’s	 rule,	 dispute	 over	 the	 country’s	 linguistic	
1	 Tadeusz	A.	Olszański,	Miejsce	UPA	w	Wielkiej	Wojnie	Ojczyźnianej.	Dyle-


























munisation	of	 the	public	 space	 that	 took	place	 in	2014–2016	and	
its	 significance.	The	 second	one	presents	 the	 change	of	 attitude	
towards	World	War	II,	including	the	problem	posed	by	the	Holo-
caust	and	the	attitude	towards	the	UPA	and	Stepan	Bandera	in	the	
Ukrainian	 remembrance	policy.	The	 third	part	discusses	 a	new	
element	which	 is	 the	most	 surprising	and	signifies	 the	greatest	
changes	 in	 the	 Ukrainian	 collective	 consciousness:	 the	 process	
of	 returning	 the	 Ukrainian	 People’s	 Republic	 and	 the	 strug-




























forming	 identity	 (and	 thus	 also	 historical	 policy).	 War	 was	 no	
longer	a	story	of	the	past	or	of	other	distant	countries:	it	affected	
their	own	land,	their	compatriots	and	often	people	close	to	them.	





ifested	 in	both	state	policy	 (official	 restrictions	on	 the	presence	
of	both	 the	Russian	 language	and	 cultural	products	 originating	
from	the	Russian	Federation,	above	all	songs,	in	the	mass	media,	




























people	who	often	 stop	using	 the	Russian	 language	despite	 their	
highly	 insufficient	command	of	Ukrainian,	and	make	 the	effort	
to	 improve	 their	 knowledge	 of	Ukrainian.	The	war	 seems	 to	 be	
far	from	over	today,	so	it	 is	difficult	to	predict	what	its	ultimate	
impact	will	be	on	public	life.	However,	the	latter	of	the	elements	







had	arisen	earlier,	 that	Ukraine	 is	 isolated	on	 the	 international	





tion,	 both	 international	 and	 domestic,	 Ukraine	 has	 no	 chance	
whatsoever	of	joining	NATO	or	the	European	Union7.	Sometimes	






























the	NKVD	in	1944–1953’8,	which	 is	difficult	 to	describe	 in	 terms	
other	than	a	manifestation	of	megalomania.	
The	 disturbance	 of	 the	 global	 order	 (the	 civil	war	 in	 Syria,	 the	
emergence	of	Islamic	State,	the	refugee	crisis	in	Western	Europe,	
and	Brexit	and	the	disputes	over	the	future	shape	of	the	European	
Union	 associated	with	 it)	 is	 perfectly	 seen	 from	Kyiv’s	 perspec-
tive,	triggering	the	growing	widespread	response	to	it	in	the	form	










8	 Oleksandr	Zinchenko,	‘Zamist'	pislamovy’	[in]	Vijya dvokh pravd. Polaky ta 










































the	 leading	Ukrainian	politicians	were	aware	of	 the	need	 for	 the	
state	to	adopt	a	historical	policy,	they	completely	failed	to	under-
stand	what	it	should	be	like,	nor	was	it	a	priority	for	them.	So	Prime	


















































prevalent	 in	 the	public	 sphere.	Their	ambition	 is	 to	 shape	 these	
opinions.	 They	 want	 to	 be	 ‘decommunisers’	 not	 only	 of	 street	
names	but	also	of	people’s	minds.	They	understand	that	the	war-
time	 patriotic	mobilisation	which	 is	 viewed	 by	 a	 section	 of	 the	
public	(including	themselves)	as	a	comfortable	situation	and	not	
an	 inconvenience,	offers	 them	a	unique	chance.	 If	 they	are	able	
to	act	for	a	sufficient	period	of	time,	especially	influencing	school	
education,	they	may	achieve	durable	success.	They	visibly	do	not	








freedom	of	 expressing	opinions	 that	 are	 contrary	 to	 the	official	
narrative,	 and	 it	 also	 influences	 the	way	 sociologists	 formulate	
questions13.	The	answer	‘I	don’t	know’	or	‘difficult	to	say’	very	of-
13	 Cf.	the	Report	of	the	Institute	of	Political	Studies	of	the	Polish	Academy	of	Sci-








































According	 to	 polls,	 there	 has	 been	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 positive	
perception	of	OUN	and	the	UPA	(clearer	 in	the	case	of	 the	 latter	

































































ing	 “the	Communist	 totalitarian	 regime	 existing	 in	 1917–1991	in	
Ukraine”	 and	 “the	national-socialist	 (Nazi)	 totalitarian	 regime”	
as	criminal	and	imposing	a	ban	on	the	propagation	thereof	(this	















































only	 so-called	 Stalinism)	 as	 equally	 totalitarian	 and	 equally	
criminal	regimes	 that	equally	deserve	 international	condemna-




































1,320	monuments	 and	busts	of	Lenin	and	 1,069	monuments	 and	






activist	 from	Donbas)	 in	 Svyatohirsk25,	 and	 also	 –	 at	 least	 until	
winter	2017	–	a	bust	of	Marx	in	the	Kyiv-based	Roshen	confection-
ery	 factory.	A	Leonid	Brezhnev	bust	has	also	been	 left	 intact	 in	
the	heart	 of	Kamianske	 (a	historical	 name	 returned	 to	 the	 city	
formerly	known	as	Dniprodzerzhynsk).	For	obvious	reasons,	de-








headquarters,	 dominating,	 along	 with	 monuments	 commemo-
rating	 the	 Great	 Patriotic	 War,	 heroes	 in	 the	 symbolic	 space	





23	 These	 and	 further	 numerical	 data	 have	 been	 taken	 from	 Viatrovych’s	































as	 the	base	 for	 religious	monuments.	 So	 in	 general,	 the	plinths	
(or	the	places	left	after	monuments	that	have	been	removed	com-
pletely)	are	waiting	for	a	new	‘host’,	and	local	governments	would	
rather	 not	 use	 them	 as	 the	 base	 for	 new	monuments	 (many	 of	
these	are	still	created	in	Ukraine	regardless	of	the	tough	econom-




of	monuments	 to	 ‘Russian-Ukrainian	brotherhood’	 (such	 as	 the	
Kyiv	 monument	 commemorating	 the	 anniversary	 of	 Ukraine’s	
unification	with	Russia,	the	so-called	‘Yoke	of	Freedom’,	or	a	simi-
































made	 by	 local	 governments	 or,	 if	 these	 did	 not	 take	measures,	
by	 bodies	 of	 the	 territorial	 state	 administration)	were	 changed	









(although	 only	 nine	 of	 the	 numerous	 court	 complaints	 reached	
the	Supreme	Court	by	the	end	of	201628),	especially	in	the	two	in-
dustrial	 metropolises	 of	 Dnieper	 Ukraine:	 Dnipropetrovsk	 and	




















































garian	Communists	were	 renamed	 after	 Bulgarian	 19th	 century	
patriotic	activists.	
29	 Bohdanivske	(formerly	Zhovtneve,	October)	in	Kharkiv	Oblast,	Hordiyen-































morial	 names.	We	 do	 not	 have	 collective	 data	 to	 this	 effect;	 it	 is	










locations.	 Naming	 one	 of	 Odessa’s	 streets	 after	 Shukhevych	 did	














































sary	of	 the	establishment	of	 the	UPA.	Regardless	of	 the	 contro-
versies	that	almost	direct	reference	to	this	formation’s	tradition	
may	provoke,	 shifting	 the	celebration	date	 is	 an	 important	 step	
distancing	the	Ukrainian	tradition	from	the	Russian	one.	
Another	 stage	 of	 decommunisation,	 according	 to	 UINP,	 will	 be	
a	calendar	reform,	i.e.	replacing	 ‘Communist’	holidays	with	 ‘na-
tional’	 ones.	 The	 draft	 published	 by	 the	 Institute	 in	 February	
2017	which	was	adjusted	in	April	2017	after	‘public	consultations’	
which	were	not	precisely	 identified35	not	only	shifts	the	holiday	




The	draft	 limits	 the	number	of	non-working	holidays	and	 intro-
duces	a	cycle	distributed	evenly	during	the	year	of	holidays	linked	
























including	 the	 Day	 of	 Remembrance	 of	 the	 Holocaust	 Victims	
(29	September,	the	anniversary	of	the	Babi	Yar	Massacre),	the	Day	
of	 Remembrance	 of	 the	 Victims	 of	 the	 Crimean	 Tatar	 Genocide	
(18	May)	and	the	Day	of	Remembrance	of	the	Victims	of	the	Com-
























III. The real end of The GreaT PaTrIoTIc war
The	lengthy	dispute	between	the	concepts	of	 the	Great	Patriotic	
War	(fought	by	the	USSR	and	its	allies	against	Nazi	Germany	in	
1941–1945)	 and	World	War	 II	 (fought	 by	 the	 Allies	 against	 Nazi	
Germany	and	 Japan	 in	 1939–1945)	was	 radically	 resolved	by	 the	
Act	on	the	Commemoration	of	the	Victory	over	Nazism	in	World	











porary	 concession	 is	 the	 aforementioned	 draft	 calendar	 reform	
which	envisages	that	8	and	not	9	May	will	be	a	national	holiday	
and	a	non-working	day.	




military	 engagement	 of	 Polish	 Army	 soldiers	 of	 Ukrainian	 na-
tional	 background),	 and	 even	 a	 little	 earlier	 (in	 some	 interpre-
tations,	 the	fights	 between	 the	Carpathian	Sich	 and	Hungarian	
troops	 in	March	 1939	marked	 Ukrainians’	 first	 encounter	 with	













































40	 Here	and	below,	quoted	from	UINP’s	brochure	Ukrayina u Druhyi svitovyi viyni,	















































































IV. The Place of The uPa In The naTIonal 
TradITIon










ist	 organisations	 (the	party	Svoboda46	 and	 the	marginal	 groups	
which	became	 integrated	 already	on	 the	Maidan	 into	 the	Right	
Sector47)	 played	 a	major,	 albeit	 not	 decisive,	 role,	 and	 then	 the	
war,	in	the	first	phase	of	which	volunteer	formations	consisting	
to	some	extent	of	members	of	these	organisations,	played	an	im-




the	other	of	 the	clear	 image	of	 these	organisations,	 their	 rheto-
ric	and	symbols	which	attract	attention.	This	attractiveness	has	
45	 This	photograph	was	used	as	an	illustration	for	Mykhailo	Dublyansky’s	arti-

































ing	 the	 entire	 Maidan	 community	 as	 ‘Banderofascist’	 (in	 fact,	
radical	nationalists	formed	a	clear	minority	there)	and	reviving	
the	 old	 Soviet	 stereotype	which	 places	 an	 equals	 sign	 between	
fascism	on	the	one	side	and	Ukraine’s	struggle	for	independence	
against	 Russia	 on	 the	 other.	This	 kind	 of	 propaganda	 provoked	





Bandera and Banderovtsy 
Stepan	 Bandera	 became	 the	 main	 ‘hero’	 of	 the	 Soviet	 anti-
Ukrainian	propaganda,	even	a	negative	symbol	of	the	 ‘West-
ern’	 Ukrainianness	 (cf.	 the	 contemptuous	 branding	 of	 the	
Ukrainian	language	as	‘Bandera	tongue’,	frequently	seen	until	
the	 1980s)	probably	because	of	his	name,	being	–	using	con-
temporary	 terminology	 –	 a	meme	per	 se,	 linguistically	 ‘for-
eign’	(the	origin	of	the	surname	Bandera	is	unclear)	and	at	the	
same	time	associated	with	the	words	‘band,	bandit’	(the	term	




















‘bandera’	 has	 been	used	 in	 the	meaning	 ‘Banderovets’	 since	
at	 least	 the	1950s).	The	role	played	by	Bandera	at	 the	time	of	
World	War	 II	 (he	was	 in	German	captivity	 in	 1941–1944)	did	
not	 predestine	 him	 to	 become	 a	 symbol	 of	 either	 the	 UPA’s	
struggle	or	the	crimes	committed	by	this	organisation;	other	
people	played	 the	main	 role	 in	both	 these	areas.	This	Soviet	
propaganda	 stereotype	has	been	 taken	over	by	 independent	
Ukraine,	reversing	the	signs.	
Bandera	himself,	even	though	it	 is	mainly	he	to	whom	mon-
uments	 are	 erected	 (most	 of	 them	 were	 built	 before	 2014),	
remains	 somewhat	 out	 of	 the	 way	 in	 this	 narrative.	 Offi-
cial	 (and	public,	where	present)	 remembrance	 is	 focused	on	
Banderovtsy	who	are	 identified	with	 the	UPA,	 the	 ‘steadfast	
army’	and	 its	commanders,	especially	Roman	Shukhevych49.	
It	is	they	who	are	treated	as	heroes,	it	is	their	struggle	that	is	













remembrance	 includes,	 for	example,	his	 110th	birthday	 in	Lviv	 this	year,	
which	was	celebrated	with	pomp	even	though	this	date	coincided	with	the	
anniversary	of	the	Lviv	Pogrom	of	1941	in	which	some	of	the	soldiers	of	the	



























alive	 above	 all	 in	 Eastern	Galicia	 and	Volhynia.	However,	 after	
a	quarter-century	of	the	functioning	of	Ukraine’s	uniform	school	
education	system,	 it	can	no	 longer	be	said	 that	 it	was	unknown	
outside	 this	 area.	This	 is	 proven	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 popular	
teaching	materials	devoted	to	Bandera	and	the	UPA	targeted	in	an	
obvious	way	at	residents	of	central	and	eastern	Ukraine53.
The	Act	 on	 the	 Legal	 Status	 and	Honouring	 the	Memory	 of	 the	
Fighters	 for	 Ukraine’s	 Independence	 in	 the	 20th	 Century	 (part	




51	 Yuliya	Yurchuk,	Proshloye pod pritselom amnezii: pamiat’ ob OUN i UPA v Volyn-
skom regione na primere pamyatnika Klimu Savuru,	[in]	www1.ku-eichstaett.
de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss26.html,	p.	92,	accessed	on	22	May	2017.	The	







53	 One	example	 is	 the	brochure	by	Vita	Levytska,	Stepan Bandera i ya: opo-



















of	 the	 decommunisation	 package	 discussed	 above)	 granted	 this	
status	 (amongst	 others)	 to	 all	Ukrainian	military	 organisations	















ranks	 of	Ukraine’s	 national	 heroes,	 even	 though	 it	 is	 suggested	
that	 those	who	 committed	 crimes	 should	 be	 condemned	 or	 ex-
cluded	from	this	group.	This	aspect	of	the	operation	of	Ukrainian	
nationalist	formations	(both	those	who	fought	for	independence	
and	 collaborationist	 formations)	 is,	 however,	when	possible	 left	
unmentioned	 or	 blurred;	 the	 issue	 of	 Ukrainians’	 participation	
in	the	Holocaust	and	the	Nazi	pacifications	of	Belarusian,	Polish	
and	Ukrainian	villages	 is	 passed	 over	 in	 silence,	while	 the	Vol-














































in	a	 similar	manner	–	and	much	more	 in	compliance	with	 the	 facts	–	as	
‘jacquerie’	in	an	attempt	to	limit	(if	not	exclude)	the	responsibility	of	the	






















V. The shadow of The holocausT
The	Soviet	narrative	of	World	War	 II	 remembrance	avoided	dif-
ferentiating	its	victims	along	national	or	religious	lines.	This	was	
not,	 as	 is	usually	 thought,	 a	 result	 of	 the	desire	 to	 conceal	 Jew-

















few	years,	 this	way	of	 thinking	has	fitted	 in	with	 the	 tendency	
of	strengthening	the	civic	nature	of	the	Ukrainian	national	com-
munity	where	it	does	not	matter	who	is	an	ethnic	Ukrainian,	Rus-

























Russia	understands	 this	perfectly).	Ukraine	and	 its	most	 senior	
authorities	were	completely	unprepared	for	confronting	this	dis-
course.	 President	 Poroshenko’s	 apology	 for	 the	 participation	 of	
“some	Ukrainians”	 in	 the	Holocaust	during	his	visit	 to	 Israel	 in	

















Moscow’s	 anti-Ukrainian	 propaganda,	 even	 if	 this	 similarity	 is	
accidental60.	
Two	more	 elements	 obstruct	 Ukrainian	 reflection	 on	 the	Holo-
caust.	The	first	one	is	the	desire	and	endeavour	to	perceive	their	
own	 nation	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 victimhood	 and	 not	 allowing	 the	

















































VI. The (forGoTTen) memory 





taking	place	 in	both	 countries.	There	 is	no	doubt	 that	 for	UINP	
and	the	circles	supporting	it	the	memory	of	the	Volhynia	Massa-
cre	is	inconvenient	and	they	would	rather	freeze	any	discussions	



















































jointly	 honour	 the	 victims	 of	 the	 conflict,	 jointly	 condemn	 those	
who	committed	crimes	and	create	a	common	platform	for	dialogue	
between	historians,	publish	a	 joint	presidential	Declaration	of	Re-
membrance	 and	 Reconciliation,	 jointly	 set	 a	 day	 of	 remembrance	
of	the	victims	of	the	conflict	and	together	erect	a	monument	to	the	




















































VII. one hundred years of IndePendence, 
one hundred years of war





nia	 to	 the	 president	 of	 Ukraine	 in	 1992	was	 disregarded	 by	 the	
Ukrainian	 state,	 and	 the	 constitution	mentions	 only	 in	 general	
terms	 “centuries	 of	 tradition	 of	 the	 operation	 of	 the	Ukrainian	
state.”	The	Ukrainian	Independent	[and]	United	State	proclaimed	




Act	 on	 the	Participants	 of	 the	 Struggle	 for	Ukraine’s	 Independ-
ence	of	9	April68	2015	which	states,	amongst	other	things,	the	fol-
lowing,	“considering	the	fact	that	the	Central	Council	of	Ukraine	


















































the	 generally	 understood	 right	 of	 nations	 to	 self-determination	
(as	 is	provided	 in	 the	constitution)	but	on	specific	acts	of	 inter-



































20th	 century”	 (and	 thus	 that	 the	 struggle	 for	 independence	was	









of	Ukraine	 in	 the	 20th	 century	 shall	 be	 deemed	 as	 deriding	 the	
memory	of	 those	who	 fought	 for	Ukraine’s	 independence	 in	 the	
20th	century	and	degrading	the	dignity	of	the	Ukrainian	Nation,	
and	is	illegal”72.
The	 initial	 coherent	 draft	has	 been	 completely	wasted.	 Reading	
the	adopted	text	of	the	act,	it	is	impossible	to	understand	what	the	




























However,	 UINP	 has	 not	 given	 up	 on	 restoring	 the	 20th	 century	
state	 tradition	 in	 Ukraine.	 The	 one	 hundredth	 anniversary	 of	
these	 events	 served	 as	 an	 occasion	 for	 this.	 In	March	 2017,	 the	

















































the	 processes	 which	were	 centred	 on	Moscow	 and	 Petrograd78.	





The	 celebrations	 include	 numerous	 planned	 academic	 confer-
ences	 and	 publications	 and	will	most	 likely	 provoke	 numerous	
discussions	 and	 disputes79	 that	will	 be	meaningful	 not	 only	 for	





months	 and	under	German	occupation)	 by	Pavlo	 Skoropadskyi,	
77	 Cf.	Orest	Subtelny,	Ukrayina. Istoriya,	Kyiv	1991,	p.	310.	For	more	details	on	
the	role	played	by	this	work	in	the	shaping	of	the	historical	narrative	of	in-
dependent	Ukraine	see:	Tadeusz	A.	Olszański,	Miejsce UPA w Wielkiej Wojnie 
Ojczyźnianej…,	op. cit.,	p.	17.	
78	 The	grounds	 for	 treating	 the	 then	developments	as	 a	 revolution	and	not	
merely	a	struggle	for	national	liberation,	as	well	as	for	the	distinctness	of	
the	Ukrainian	and	Russian	revolutionary	processes	can	be	found	in:	Jarosław	
Hrycak,	Historia Ukrainy 1772–1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu,	Lublin	
2000,	pp.	115–118.	
























































































Skoropadskyi)	 and	 a	 revival	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 social	 left	 (draw-
ing	 upon	 the	 pro-independence	 traditions	 of	 Socialist	 parties).	
If	it	becomes	possible	to	establish	a	formal	link	between	modern	























is	 cherished	 by	 the	 supreme	 state	 authorities	 and	 diplomacy84,	




















Ukraine’s	 remembrance	 policy	 and	 also	 its	 historical	 memory	
(not	 only	 in	 connection	with	 this	 policy)	 is	 undergoing	 a	 great	
transformation.	The	war	has	revalorised	numerous	thought	pat-








Ukraine	 is	not	a	 ‘lonely	 island’;	 the	changes	 taking	place	across	
the	modern	world	 also	 affect	 it.	 In	 turn,	 identity	 policy	 is	 cur-
rently	undergoing	 great	 changes	 linked	 to	 its	new	 socialisation	
(or	 democratisation)	 resulting	 from	 new	 information	 sharing	
technologies.	The	increasingly	strong	role	played	by	social	media	
segmenting	the	discourse	(that	help	exchange	opinions	not	only	
within	 a	 circle	 of	 those	with	 a	 similar	mindset),	 Twitter	which	
forces	 its	users	 to	 formulate	 their	 thoughts	 in	a	very	brief	 form	
and	 thus	 radically,	without	 going	 into	 any	nuances	 or	 explana-





























pecially	 to	distinguish	what	 is	a	 spontaneously	 formed,	earnest	
(though	 erroneous)	 opinion	 and	 what	 is	 a	 well-thought-out	 lie	
aimed	at	derailing	the	discussion.	This	 is	being	used	by	various	
centres	of	 influence	 interested	 in	pushing	public	discussions	 in	
the	directions	desirable	to	them.	
This	has	a	special	meaning	for	historical	policy	because	its	threads	




































































The one hundredth anniversary of the Ukrainian 
Revolution: the official celebration plan
The	plan	for	celebrating	one	hundred	years	of	the	war	for	independ-
ence	 developed	 by	 the	 Ukrainian	 Institute	 of	 National	 Remem-
brance	and	approved	by	the	Ukrainian	government85	envisages	the	
commemoration	of	the	anniversaries	of	the	following	events86.	
[1]	 The	 one	 hundredth	 anniversary	 of	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	
Ukrainian	Revolution	and	 the	establishment	of	 the	Central	
Council	of	Ukraine,	March	2017.	
[2]	 The	one	hundredth	anniversary	of	 the	 forming	of	 the	First	








[4]	 The	one	hundredth	 anniversary	of	 the	proclamation	of	 the	
Ukrainian	People’s	Republic,	November	2017.




This	 sequence	 of	 anniversaries	 illustrates	 the	 way	 the	
































[8]	 The	 one	 hundredth	 anniversary	 of	 liberating	 Crimea	 from	
the	Bolsheviks,	April	2018.







































[13]	 The	one	hundredth	 anniversary	 of	 the	 First	Winter	March	
of	the	UNR	Army,	December	2019.
The	Winter	March	was	an	attempt	of	saving	part	of	the	forc-
es	of	 the	defeated	army	by	 sending	 it	 on	a	 raid	 in	 the	 rear	




Polish-Ukrainian	 offensive	 followed	 by	 a	 retreat,	 the	 par-
ticipation	 of	 UNR	 troops	 in	 a	 defence	 operation	 in	August	






The	 Second	Winter	March	 (or	 Ice	March),	which	 ended	 in	





It	 is	 characteristic	 that	 the	 anniversaries	 of	 these	 upris-
ings	 that	 continued	 until	 1922,	 the	 symbol	 of	which	 is	 the	
so-called	 Kholodnyi	 Yar	 Republic	 (present-day	 Cherkasy	
Oblast)	have	not	been	included	in	the	official	state	narrative.	
These	 anniversaries	will	 also	 certainly	 be	 commemorated,	
but	as	part	of	a	separate	agenda.	
